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Fear Not: A Critical Perspective on the Terrorist 
Threat in Europe 
Thomas Renard 
Over the past few months, Europe has 
been struck by a number of terrorist 
attacks. In the media, in political 
discourse, in our daily lives, terrorism is 
now perceived as being omnipresent. A 
certain form of collective psychosis is 
developing within the population, which 
is perhaps more insidious and dangerous 
than terrorism itself. This policy brief 
seeks to offer some arguments to counter 
the fear of terrorism. It is also challenges 
the idea that terrorism can be itself 
‘contagious’. Finally, it argues in favour 
of a measured, comprehensive and 
inclusive approach to counterterrorism. 
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Taken together, these events and the 
subsequent media coverage have created a 
permanent stream of information that 
exacerbates anxiety. The perceived ubiquity of 
the terrorist threat has become a new reality 
for European citizens, which is further 
reinforced by the security-focused political 
discourse. The communication of threat levels 
by the authorities is somehow institutionalising –
- almost normalising –- the threat perception. 
In Belgium, the threat level has been at three 
out of a maximum four for months, while 
France has been under a ‘state of emergency’ 
since last November. 
 
Is this the ‘new normal’, as The Economist once 
asked? Are we confronted with a ‘wave of 
terror’, as the German daily Bild wondered 
after the killing of a priest in Saint-Etienne-du-
Rouvray, France, in July? In the context of a 
growing collective psychosis, this policy brief 
aims to put the current threat in perspective, 
reflecting on the notion of waves in modern 
terrorism. Following the multiplication of 
attacks claimed by the Islamic State (ISIS), the 
brief also aims to explain how terrorism 
spreads, but also to challenge the somewhat 
simplistic idea that terrorism could be 
‘contagious’. Finally, based on the principle 
that terror must be fought as much as 
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A distinct feeling of anxiety has taken root in 
Europe, as terrorism is increasingly perceived 
as having become part of our daily life. 
Following the major attacks in Paris 
(November 2015) and Brussels (March 2016), 
the number of ‘smaller’ incidents has 
multiplied at an accelerated pace, mostly in 
France and Germany. The media have 
extensively reported on these attacks, as well as 
on other terrorism-related news, such as police 
operations, arrests, trials and foiled plots.  
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terrorism, I offer some thoughts to avoid the 
trap of collective psychosis. 
 
TERROR WAVES 
As the fear of terrorism grows in Europe, it is 
important to determine how real the threat is. 
A key starting point in such effort is to 
examine objective figures. According to 
Europol, the European law enforcement 
agency, terrorism is indeed on the rise in 
Europe.1 There have been 211 failed, foiled or 
completed attacks last year, which marks a 
notable increase of 39% from 2013, following 
a steady fourfold decrease in the period 2007-
13. The number of terror-related arrests has 
boomed as well, reaching 1,077 in 2015, a 
twofold increase from 2013 and the highest 
number recorded by Europol since it started 
publishing its annual assessments in 2006. 
 
Islamist terrorism is largely responsible for this 
upsurge. Although attacks from jihadi groups 
still represent a minority of the total attacks 
recorded, that number is increasing whereas 
most other forms of terrorism are decreasing 
(most notably separatism, which has long been 
the dominating form of terrorism in Europe, 
while right-wing terrorism is on the rise again). 
The trend is likely to be confirmed in 2016. 
Since the beginning of the year, more than ten 
attacks across Europe have been attributed to, 
or inspired by, ISIS. A number of foiled plots 
have been reported as well. With regard to 
arrests, a large majority of the arrests made in 
2015 was related to Islamist terrorism. This 
number has steadily increased over the past 
years, to rise from around 20% to more than 
70% of all arrests in Europe. 
 
Europol figures confirm the popular 
impression that terrorism is rising, while 
simultaneously highlighting the fact that jihadi 
activities are still largely contained 
underground, as indicated by the low 
attacks/arrests ratio. Zooming out from 
Europe, statistics from the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) indicate that the upsurge in 
(Islamist) terrorism is in fact a global 
phenomenon.2 The number of attacks –- and 
victims thereof –- has increased exponentially 
since 2011, reaching beyond the 10,000 mark. 
Terrorism remains geographically 
concentrated, however, with a majority of the 
incidents (around 60%) and fatalities (around 
Source: Europol figures 
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80%) located in only five countries: Syria, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria.  
 
In light of the above figures, it is sensible to 
speak of a wave of terror, which heightened 
with the advent of ISIS. However, this wave 
should be understood as being part of a 
broader jihadi wave, starting in the early 1980s 
when a number of Arab mujahedeen coalesced 
against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
From there and then, the jihad has continued 
and globalised until now. Islamist terrorist 
groups were already active in Europe in the 
1980s and 1990s, mostly for recruitment and 
financing purposes. But it is essentially in the 
2000s that Europe became an important target 
of jihadi terrorism, following the rise of al-
Qaeda and the so-called ‘global war on terror’, 
even though the continent had been struck by 
Islamist terrorism before, notably Algerian 
groups in France.  The current upsurge in 
violence should therefore be seen as the high 
tide of this jihadi wave, more than a new, 
separate wave. 
 
In the current climate of anxiety, it may not be 
reassuring to read that we are living through a 
high tide of terrorism. And yet, I make three 
key observations that put the current threat in 
perspective and, hopefully, should lessen 
anxiety. First, this wave of terrorism is far from 
being the first one. In fact, David C. Rapoport 
argues that there have been four major waves 
of global terrorism in the modern era: anarchist 
(1880s-1920s), nationalist/anti-colonialist 
(1920s-1960s), new left/milleniarist (1960s-
2000s), and religious (1980s-).3 There is 
something cyclical about terrorism and in 
many regards, the current wave is nothing 
exceptional historically. True, the current wave 
of terrorism may appear more violent than its 
predecessors, notably due to the use of brazen 
brutality against indiscriminate targets (mostly 
civilians), and be more diffuse geographically. 
And yet, the differences between the ‘new’ 
terrorism and the ‘old’ one are not as clear-cut 
as some scholars have argued. There is a lot of 
continuity in modern terrorism. 
 
Second, Europe has been struck by each of the 
four modern waves of terror. And despite the 
recent tragic events, Europe is much safer 
from terrorism today than it was in the past. 
Indeed, there were significantly more attacks –- 
and victims — in the last decades of the 20th 
century than in the first part of the 21st. For 
instance, according to figures from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), there were more 
than 1,000 attacks in 1979 in western Europe 
compared with around 300 in 2015. From the 
mid-1970s until the mid-1990s, more than 150 
persons died every year from terrorism in 
Europe, while that number dropped to double 
digits in the following years. Even with the 
Paris attacks, there were still fewer fatalities 
from terrorism in Europe in 2015 than in an 
average year of the late 20th century. Today’s 
fear of terrorism has more to do with 
psychology – how people perceive and live 
with terrorism – than with the actual threat. 
 
Third, if Europe has not collapsed under the 
continuous assault of terrorism for over a 
century, it is essentially because terrorism 
remains a marginal phenomenon.  The 
European police agency Europol estimates that 
more than 5,000 Europeans have left to join 
Islamist fighters in Syria, which represents a 
major challenge indeed for security services 
when these people return with training and a 
mission. However, one should not lose sight of 
the fact that this number represents barely 
0.00001% of the European population.  In 
addition, a significant number of these ‘foreign 
fighters’ are now deceased. Furthermore, the 
risk of dying from terrorism is also incredibly 
marginal. Statistically, people have a higher 
chance of dying from a car accident, or from 
falling off their bed or a ladder. Left-handed 
people have a higher chance of dying using a 
right-handed device than in a terrorist attack. 
Terrorism is not an existential threat to our 
societies. It is an embedded risk, a marginal 
byproduct of modern societies. 
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IS IT CONTAGIOUS? 
One of the striking elements of the recent 
wave of attacks is the fact that the incidents are 
seemingly able to take place anywhere, 
anytime, and to be carried out by virtually 
anyone. Most attackers did not seem 
predisposed to wage jihad, but are rather petty 
criminals with little or no religious background. 
Perhaps even more strikingly, recent attacks in 
Europe seemed to echo one another, in an 
apparent effect of ‘contagion’ as some 
journalists have put it.4 There were a number 
of similarities in the latest attacks, in the 
profiles of the attackers as well as in their modus 
operandi.  
 
Creating such feelings of unstoppable, 
contagious violence is precisely the objective of 
ISIS’s terror campaign in Europe. For the 
terrorist organisation, every attack is less an 
end in itself than a means to achieve three 
goals: triggering fear, polarisation and over-
reaction within the ‘enemy’; transforming the 
discourse into a tangible reality of violence, 
which can then be used for propaganda and 
recruitment purposes; and eventually 
stimulating more attacks, by encouraging 
others to ‘follow the example’.  
 
ISIS has been quite effective at spreading 
terror. A growing number of European citizens 
are now scared of terrorism to the point that 
they adapt their daily behaviour to the 
possibility of an attack. They change their 
holiday plans accordingly as well. Meanwhile, 
several public events have either been modified 
or cancelled, even when no specific threat has 
been identified. Fear is now part of our daily 
lives and that is a major victory for ISIS. As 
explained in the next section, we should 
actively seek to defeat our fear, much as we 
seek to defeat ISIS. 
 
ISIS has also been fairly successful at recruiting 
members and sympathisers, and thus at 
spreading its message. The terrorist 
organisation managed to attract a significant 
number of ‘foreign fighters’ from across the 
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globe, around 30,000 according to the Soufan 
Group.5 Among this contingent, more than 
5,000 Europeans have joined the group in 
Syria and Iraq. These figures put ISIS far above 
any other contemporary terrorist organisation 
in its recruitment strategy.6 More impressive 
still are the figures of ISIS sympathisers, by 
which I mean individuals that consume 
regularly (and further diffuse) the group’s 
propaganda. Although there is little reliable 
data available, occasional assessments suggest 
that there are tens of thousands sympathisers 
on social media alone. A 2014 study identified 
between 46,000 and 70,000 Twitter accounts 
used by ISIS supporters, with an average of 
1,000 followers each and sometimes many 
more.7 Whereas these numbers are likely to 
have changed since then, reports from Twitter 
confirm a continued high level of activity. The 
social media company is said to delete more 
than 20,000 accounts every month related to 
terrorism and violent extremism.8 
 
The Islamic State has also demonstrated its 
ability to inspire attacks, certainly more than al-
Qaeda did before. Some of the recent attacks 
in Europe were conducted by individuals with 
relatively loose connections with ISIS, 
according to the principle of ‘leaderless jihad’ 
followed by the group. For ISIS leadership, 
there is clearly a continuum of possible actions, 
from centrally planned and coordinated 
attacks, to isolated and spontaneous actions by 
‘lone wolves’. Between these two extremes, a 
number of scenarios exist, depending on the 
number of individuals involved, as well as on 
the depth of their ties with the organisation, 
which can be involved to different degrees, 
either ordering, planning, facilitating (through 
training or logistical support), encouraging or 
simply claiming the attack. 
 
Nevertheless, referring to the figures presented 
in the previous section of this brief, the total 
number of ISIS-related attacks in Europe 
remains very low overall, as ISIS has been 
much less successful in producing attacks than 
in creating fear and diffusing its message. In 
other words, ISIS has been better at spreading 
terror than terrorism. The media has conveyed 
the impression, explicitly or implicitly, that 
attacks can trigger more attacks by themselves, in 
an automated, self-propelling cycle of violence. 
This perception is not, however, supported by 
academic literature. A phenomenon of 
imitation, or ‘copycat’ is possible – and in fact 
even likely — under certain circumstances but 
such acts are committed primarily by mentally 
unstable persons and remain isolated events. In 
these cases, furthermore, the label ‘terrorism’ 
should not be applied. Individuals that act 
under pathological impulsion rather than for 
clearly identified political or ideological 
purposes are mere criminals, not terrorists.  
 
Beyond pathological cases, it is possible that an 
attack could motivate other already-radicalised 
individuals to take action. The ‘trigger effect’ 
has long been mentioned in studies on 
radicalisation and causes of terrorism, as the 
undefined variable that precipitates an 
individual’s movement toward violent 
extremism. Such an explanation, however, 
presupposes a broader radicalisation process, 
which relies itself on multiple, complex and 
overlapping factors. In light of this literature, 
arguing than one attack could automatically 
trigger another one appears therefore to be an 
oversimplification, as it focuses on the very last 
piece of a more complex phenomenon. 
 
What the academic literature does support, 
however, is the idea that terrorism can be 
contagious at a broader level. At the strategic 
level, some organisations may have been 
influenced in their decisions to adopt terrorist 
tactics by the actions of other terrorist 
organisations. Historically, for instance, third 
world groups inspired the founders of the Red 
Army Faction (RAF) in the 1970s and there is 
fear that also today, right-wing terrorism could 
rise in reaction to the upsurge in Islamist 
terrorism. At the tactical level, some types of 
attack tend to be imitated and repeated if they 
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are considered effective, notably by attracting 
media coverage. Historically, some ‘innovative’ 
forms of action have proliferated after their 
first appearance, such as kidnappings, hostage 
taking, suicide attacks and, more recently, 
beheadings. 
 
Competition between different groups could 
also be seen as contributing to the ‘contagion’ 
of terrorism. Since the political and media 
space is limited, terrorist organisations (and 
cells within them) compete for publicity, 
membership and leadership. In this context, 
competition between groups can lead to a 
growing number of attacks. Regarding the 
rivalry between ISIS and al-Qaeda, for 
example, some intelligence officials fear that al-
Qaeda could now seek to plan operations in 
Europe. The last major al-Qaeda operation in 
Europe was the attack on the editorial team of 
the French satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo in 
January 2015, claimed by al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 
 
In sum, the notion that terrorism can be 
contagious is not without foundation, but it 
must be taken with caution, not least because 
such a description can increase citizens’ anxiety 
and serve the purposes of terror groups. 
 
NOTHING TO FEAR BUT FEAR ITSELF 
Terrorism is a serious threat to our Western 
societies, but not an existential one. History 
teaches us that it is far from being a new 
phenomenon and that Europe has been 
confronted with worse waves before. 
Furthermore, very few terrorist organisations 
have ever achieved their strategic objectives. In 
fact, terrorist organisations have a limited life 
span of five to 10 years according to David C. 
Rapoport. In other words, time is on our side. 
 
In this context, our greatest enemy is not ISIS, 
but ourselves. The danger comes less from 
ISIS actions than from our own 
(over)reactions. When a Western government 
declares ‘war’ on the Islamic State, it 
exaggerates the nature of the fight and 
amplifies societal anxiety. The same is true 
when a Western parliament adopts measures of 
exception, discriminatory laws or liberticidal 
policies.  
 
This is not to say that nothing should be done 
to fight ISIS. The work of police and 
intelligence services, as well as of prevention 
and social workers, is crucial to maintain the 
risk of terrorism at the lowest possible level. 
Diplomacy, sometimes backed by military 
action, is also essential to avoid a terrorist 
organisation gaining too much power and 
influence, as ISIS has done in the Middle East. 
In every area of counterterrorism – from 
prevention to repression – good practices must 
be identified and emulated. Resources should 
also be increased where they are needed, for 
instance to limit the diffusion of ISIS messages 
online, and to develop an effective counter-
narrative strategy.  
 
More needs to be done in the field of 
counterterrorism, and European governments 
have a major responsibility therein. 
Nevertheless, more attention should be paid to 
the contagion of fear, perhaps even more than 
to the contagion of terrorism. Indeed, it is not 
terrorism that divides our societies, but the fear 
of the ‘other’. It is not terrorism that hurts the 
economy, but the fear of leaving our homes. It 
is not terrorism that endangers our democracy, 
but measures dictated by fear. The adequacy of 
counterterrorism policies must be carefully and 
constantly assessed because some of them may 
prove ineffective, which is problematic given 
limited resources. Worse, some measures can 
even prove counter-productive. The fight 
against terrorism requires above all to tackle 
the deeper causes of terrorism, through social, 
economic, cultural and educational policies, 
which actually have much less to do with 
terrorism than with the development of a more 
inclusive, egalitarian and dynamic society. The 
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best counter-narrative against ISIS is not a 
defensive one, as if our values and freedom 
were under attack, but an offensive one that 
builds on a positive vision for our society. 
 
The media play a key role as well in the fight 
against terror. The interdependence between 
media and terrorist organisations is well 
known: terrorists need media attention to 
communicate their message, and conversely, 
terrorism-related stories feed the media cycle, 
which further amplifies collective anxiety. Over 
the past weeks, some media outlets have begun 
debating various measures aimed at 
diminishing the publicity their coverage 
provides these terrorist organisations, 
particularly in France. For instance, some 
media have decided to no longer publish 
names or photos of the perpetrators in order 
to deny individuals the glorification they are 
seeking. Such measures will only have limited 
impact, however, especially if only a small 
number of media adopts them. A more 
effective measure would be to encourage and 
develop a more sober, precise and pedagogical 
approach to terrorism. Quality journalism is 
not only about long and fastidious 
investigations; it is also about deontology 
(following certain rules) and pedagogy 
(explaining with simple words very complex 
phenomena). In contrast, hyper-mediatisation 
results in the diffusion of rumours, as well as 
superficial and simplistic explanations, which 
lead to more anxiety.  
 
Beyond political and media responses, it is in 
the end every citizen that is battling on the 
frontline against terror. People can take a 
number of measures to limit their fear of 
terrorism. They can seek quality information, 
in order to better understand the nature of the 
threat. They can also rationalise the low risk of 
a terror incident happening to them personally. 
Above all, they can decide to carry on with 
their lives without being paralysed by fear, 
while remaining aware of official warnings. 
Refusing to be afraid is, in this context, an act 
of resistance.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The fear of terrorism is now deeply rooted in 
the popular psyche. Last August, in Juan-les-
Pins, France, it took only some firecrackers to 
create mass panic among people enjoying the 
evening on café terraces, resulting in 45 
injured. In the popular perception, every 
murder or accident reported in the news 
becomes a potential terrorist attack. 
Consciously or not, people are constantly 
evaluating the terror risk, and adapting their 
behaviour accordingly, while military and 
police patrols are an ever-present reminder that 
some level of threat does exist. 
 
The omnipresence of the terrorist threat is not 
only constraining our physical and 
psychological lives, it is also shaping societal 
perceptions and political debates. But fear is 
not a good counsellor. Counter-productive 
measures have been passed as a result of the 
current security climate. The decision to ban 
the infamous ‘burkini’ in several French 
municipalities was not only anti-constitutional, 
it has also become invaluable propaganda 
material for ISIS recruiters denouncing French 
intolerance vis-à-vis Muslim communities. In 
contrast, more positive ideas become tainted as 
soon as they are pinned with the 
‘counterterrorism’ label. For instance, debates 
about integration policies or about a ‘European 
Islam’ have long been necessary for their own 
sake, but they are now seen through the 
counterterrorism prism, which will inevitably 
discredit some of the ideas and actions 
resulting from these debates. 
 
This policy brief underscores that the current 
terrorist threat in Europe is very serious, even 
increasing, but not existential. Jihadi groups 
cannot defeat us but we can defeat ourselves. 
For this reason, our response to terrorism must 
be measured, comprehensive and inclusive. It 
 8 
 
must be measured by seeing terrorism for what it 
is: a marginal phenomenon with potentially 
terrible consequences. Counterterrorism policies 
must be proportional, non-discriminatory and, 
above all, respect our own democratic and 
human principles. Our response must be 
comprehensive by tackling the problem in its 
entirety, from prevention to repression. And 
finally, it must be inclusive by relying on a 
broadened societal project, involving a very 
wide range of actors, from citizens to media, 
and from local to national authorities. 
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